Can we infer social preferences from the lab? Evidence from the trust game by Nicole M. Baran et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES











This work is part of a larger project funded by the Templeton Foundation, whose support is gratefully
acknowledged. Without the foundation’s generous support none of this would have been possible.
In addition, Paola Sapienza thanks the Zell Center for Risk Research at the Kellogg School of Management
and Luigi Zingales thanks the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and the Initiative on
Global Markets at the University of Chicago for financial support. We also thank Ernesto Reuben
for his excellent research assistance and valuable suggestions throughout the process; Peggy Eppink
for her incredibly careful editing; and Denrick Bayot for his much appreciated suggestions. Additionally,
we are grateful to John List and the participants in the Chicago Booth Microeconomics Brownbag
seminar for their helpful comments. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2010 by Nicole M. Baran, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales. All rights reserved. Short sections
of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full
credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Can we infer social preferences from the lab? Evidence from the trust game
Nicole M. Baran, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales




We show that a measure of reciprocity derived from the Berg et al. (1995) trust game in a laboratory
setting predicts the reciprocal behavior of the same subjects in a real-world situation. By using the
Crowne and Marlowe (1960) social desirability scale, we do not find any evidence that a desire to
conform to social norms distorts results in the lab, yet we do find evidence that it affects results in
the field.
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luigi.zingales@ChicagoBooth.edu   One of the standard assumptions in economics is that individuals are motivated by only 
their material self-interest. In his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Adam Smith recognized 
the possibility that some individuals exhibit social preferences, but it is only in the last twenty 
years that this assumption has gained a more general acceptance among economists (see for 
example, Frank, 1988; Rabin, 1993; Fehr et al., 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and 
Rabin, 2000; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002).  
Laboratory experiments have played a crucial role in this acceptance. The laboratory 
setting allows researchers to control and manipulate the environment, isolating the effects of 
social preferences from other confounding effects (such as reputation, repeated interaction, etc.). 
The existence of social preferences has now been documented in hundreds, if not thousands, of 
papers using laboratory evidence. Experimental economists have used economic games, such as 
the Berg et al. (1995) trust game, to show that people are willing to forfeit monetary rewards so 
that anonymous co-players can gain, which violates the self-interest assumption (for a review of 
this literature, see Fehr and Schmidt, 2002).  
  However, the validity of using laboratory experiments to measure social preferences has 
been recently questioned by Levitt and List (2007). In their view, several factors distort the 
behavior of subjects in the lab. In particular, Levitt and List (2007) claim that lab experiments 
are biased by the so-called “experimenter effect.” As evidence shows, subjects in the lab 
sometimes try to please the experimenter, responding to subtle social cues that the investigator 
provides in the instructions and administration of the game (Rosenthal, 1976; Hoffman et al., 
1994). This critique is particularly strong when applied to games which attempt to measure 
social preferences as the subjects may be induced to “look good” in the eyes of the experimenter 
by exhibiting prosocial behavior, even if they would behave as self-interested individuals outside 
the laboratory. This concern is supported by evidence that subjects are sometimes more prosocial 
in the lab than they are in the field (List, 2006; Benz and Meier, 2008; and Gneezy et al., 2004).  
  One of the most interesting forms of social preferences identified in the lab is reciprocity, 
which provides a powerful explanation for one of the most fundamental questions in economics, 
the emergence of cooperation. For example, MacLeod (2007) shows that even a small taste for 
reciprocity can lead to a large increase in cooperation in relational contracts. However, in light of 
Levitt and List’s (2007) criticism, we are now left wondering whether reciprocal behavior 
observed in the lab is really an indication of true social preferences and not merely an artifact of 
the way the evidence is collected.  To answer this question, we designed a study that links a reciprocity measure obtained in 
the lab to a real-world situation where reciprocity should be the driving factor: alumni’s 
donations to their university. MBA students are generally asked to donate money to their school 
at the end of their program as a way to reciprocate the benefits of the education they received 
(which, despite the high tuition, is provided below cost). Since the MBAs are at the beginning of 
their careers and have similar incomes and wealth, the differences in the amount donated should 
reflect differences in their true preferences and not differences in their economic status. Finally, 
unlike other donations, there are no humanitarian or political reasons for giving—MBAs are not 
particularly concerned about their professors starving.  
In order to test whether individuals who are reciprocal in the real-world are also 
reciprocal in the lab, we compare the MBA students’ donation behavior to a measure of 
reciprocity obtained in the lab: their behavior as the responder in the Berg et al. (1995) trust 
game. In this game, the amount returned by the responder is a measure of her other-regarding 
preferences. To address any concern about a potential experimenter effect, we measure each 
subject’s sensitivity to social pressure via the Crowne-Marlowe (1960) social desirability scale. 
Social desirability is commonly thought of as an individual’s tendency to project favorable 
images of herself during social interaction, which allows us to control for the influence of social 
pressure or reputational concerns.  
  We find that responder behavior in the trust game predicts the amount donated to the 
university. A one standard deviation increase in the fraction of the amount returned to the sender 
by the responder increases the amount of donation by $31, equal to 31% of the average amount 
donated. This effect is robust to controlling for wealth and other demographic characteristics.  
Interestingly, the amount returned by the responder in the trust game is not correlated 
with the social desirability scale, whereas the amount donated to the university is. This finding 
indicates that social pressure has a larger effect in the field than in the lab. As a result, this 
evidence suggests that, at least in our case, reciprocity is better measured in the lab than the field.  
These results are particularly remarkable because the subject pool is a large group of 
MBA students (N = 462) at the University of Chicago. In fact, it is the entire 2008 cohort of 
campus MBAs who participated in the initial laboratory experience as part of a class at the 
beginning of their program and were observed in their donation behavior at the end of it (18 
months later).  Shockingly, 87.9% of Chicago MBA students return a positive amount in the trust 
game and 83.8% return at least 30% of what was sent to them. This is surprising because an MBA student, and especially the Chicago MBA student, is often described as the ultimate homo 
economicus—smart and self-interested. This evidence suggests that other-regarding preferences 
are widespread even among business people.  
Our lab setting has three advantages rarely found in other experiments. First, because we 
incorporate the game into a required course, our sample includes the entire 2008 cohort of 
students. We thus avoid the problem of self-selection into the lab, which may invalidate 
generalizations of results obtained in the lab (Levitt and List, 2007). Second, the amount of 
money at stake (up to $150 in our lab setting) is of the same order of magnitude as the average 
amount donated ($101). Furthermore, while the stakes in our experiment might be considered 
small in comparison to many economic decisions, they are at least five times bigger than the 
average stakes used in most laboratory experiments. 
In sum, our paper provides evidence that lab measures are a reasonably accurate way of 
predicting individual behavior in the field, bolstering support for using laboratory experiments to 
measure social preferences. It also supports the claim that reciprocity is an important—even 
characteristic—preference of many, but not all, individuals.  
As such, our paper is related to several different bodies of literature. First, it contributes 
to the growing literature on the correlation between behavior of a single individual in both the 
lab and the field (Karlan, 2005; Carpenter and Seki, 2006; Ashraf et al., 2006; Benz and Meier, 
2008; Meier and Sprenger, 2007, and Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2008). Our approach is novel because 
in our setting the correlation between the behaviors should be driven by the same trait, but the 
behaviors are observed in completely different contexts. Second, this paper contributes to the 
wealth of literature investigating the nature of reciprocity (Cox, 2004; Falk and Fischbalker, 
2006; Fehr et al, 1993; Fehr et al., 1997; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fehr 
and Schmidt, 2002; McCabe et al., 1998; Rabin, 1993). Third, it is related to the economic and 
psychological research on the motivations behind donations, particularly studies that investigate 
giving to universities (Winston, 1999; Diamond and Kashyap, 1997; Glazer and Konrad, 1996; 
Rothschild and White, 1995; Harbaugh 1998; List and Price, 2009; Rondeau and List, 2008). 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 discusses the literature. Section 2 
describes the data. Section 3 reports the main results. Section 4 presents the effect of the social 
desirability scale on subjects’ behavior. The last section (5) concludes the paper.   
 1.   Literature review  
Ever since Adam Smith first articulated it in the Wealth of Nations, the self-interest 
hypothesis has become a key assumption underlying classical and neoclassical economic models. 
It is only in the last two decades that this assumption has come into question. In their seminal 
paper, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) conjectured that while some (perhaps many) people might be 
motivated only by pure self-interest, this need not be the case for all people. They theorized that 
some people may be intrinsically motivated by “social preferences,” i.e. fairness concerns, 
reciprocity and even pure altruism. A person exhibits social preferences if the person cares not 
only about the resources allocated to him or herself, but also to other agents. 
When economists observe what appear to be social preferences in either the lab or the 
field, they can interpret it in two possible ways. The first interpretation is that the behavior is 
purely selfish because the individual is only motivated to act in a ‘fair’ or ‘cooperative’ manner 
out of concern for their reputation and/or future payoffs. A second possible interpretation is that 
the person truly has other-regarding preferences and gets utility from the pay-offs of others.  
Experimental economists have attempted to disentangle these two possibilities by measuring 
how much subjects are willing to pay to behave in prosocial ways in carefully controlled 
laboratory games in which there are no repeated interactions. Several games, particularly the 
ultimatum game, dictator game, trust game, gift exchange game, and public goods game, are 
widely used to measure the impact and magnitude of fairness concerns, cooperation, reciprocal 
behavior, inequity aversion, and altruistic behavior (for a review see Fehr and Schmidt, 2002). 
  One specific social preference that is of particular interest to economists is reciprocity. A 
reciprocal individual, according to Fehr and Fischbacher (2002), “responds to actions that are 
perceived to be kind in a kind manner, and responds to actions that are perceived to be hostile in 
a hostile manner,” even if no material gains (and sometimes even losses) are expected.
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1 Fehr and Gächter (2000) distinguish reciprocity from altruism, “Altruism is a form of unconditional kindness; that is, altruism 
given does not emerge as a response to altruism received”(pg. 160). 
 It is 
important to note that reciprocity, as it is defined, is not driven by the expectation of future 
material benefits, which makes reciprocal behavior quite different from self-interested behavior 
(Fehr and Falk, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; and Gintis, 2000). There are currently many 
examples of how reciprocal behavior can drive voluntary cooperation (Fehr et al., 1993; Berg et. 
al, 1995; Bolle and Kritiks, 1998; Brandts and Charness, 1999; Fehr and Falk, 1999, and Gächter and Falk, 2002). For example, Fehr et al. (1993) find that subjects respond positively to high 
prices (i.e. above the market-clearing price) with higher quality, providing evidence that 
reciprocal behavior may have a significant impact on the labor market. Subjects in the trust game 
have also been found to reciprocate by returning higher fractions of money when senders send 
them larger portions of their endowment (Berg et al., 1995) 
Several experiments that measure reciprocal behavior consistently find that the fraction 
of subjects that behave reciprocally in one-shot situations is between 40 and 60 percent, whereas 
20 to 30 percent of subjects do not reciprocate and behave selfishly (Berg et al., 1995; Fehr and 
Falk, 1999; Gächter and Falk, 2002). This evidence has led Fehr and others to suggest that there 
may be reciprocating “types” of people (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Gintis, 2000; Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2002) who bear the burden of rewarding or punishing, even if there is no pure 
economic benefit to them. This result is certainly interesting from a psychological perspective; 
however, the existence of social preferences may also be of crucial economic importance. 
According to Fehr and Fischbacher (2002), a failure to adequately account for social preferences 
leads us to misunderstand competition, cooperation, collective action, determination of material 
incentives, what contracts or property rights arrangements are optimal, the forces shaping social 
norms, and market failures. Furthermore, experimental economic evidence, particularly with 
respect to reciprocity, has been used to substantiate claims about the evolution of cooperative 
and social behaviors amongst humans (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; 
Fehr, 2004; Panachathan and Boyd, 2004; Henrich et al., 2005; Nowak and Sigmund, 2005).  
  Of course, the significance of such findings depends heavily on the extent to which 
people who behave reciprocally in the lab are also the type of people who behave reciprocally in 
the real-world. Levitt and List (2007) criticize using laboratory experiments to measure social 
preferences because the extent of scrutiny present in the lab is unmatched in most, if not all, real-
world situations. In a lab, subjects are keenly aware that their behavior is being observed, 
monitored, and recorded. According to Levitt and List (2007), this scrutiny may exaggerate the 
importance of prosocial behavior because the subjects want to look good in the eyes of the 
experimenter. Subjects who feel watched are more likely to behave in ways that conform to 
social norms, as a result of concerns for their reputations (see also Bandiera et al., 2004; List, 
2006; Benz and Meier, 2008; and Gneezy et al., 2004). They suggest that using the levels of 
prosocial behavior measured in the lab to infer the levels of prosocial behavior in the field is 
tenuous at best, a problem which is exacerbated by the heterogeneity in responses to social pressure in different circumstances. Thus, this critique of lab experiments brings into question 
the entire body of literature which attempts to understand the importance of social preferences. 
  Of course, reputation matters in the field, as well. In fact, social preferences may be 
measured with more, not less, noise in the field due to the existence of reputation effects. “Field 
measures of preferences are often confounded by all sorts of factors—such as budget constraints, 
reputational incentives, or information constraints” (Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2008). Since 
interactions in the fields are more likely to be repeated, it is hard to determine whether the 
observed behavior in the field is indeed the result of social preferences or reputational concerns. 
Furthermore, the kind of scrutiny, and more importantly, who is doing the scrutinizing may have 
a much larger impact on shaping behavior than simply the degree to which behavior is observed, 
recorded, and monitored. A subject may not care if a researcher thinks he is selfish, but there 
would be real social consequences if his peers or co-workers thought the he was selfish. This 
possibility raises the concern that using field experiments to test the validity of lab experiments 
requires that the field experiment be carefully designed so as to avoid confounding factors (e.g. 
reputation, competition) and to mitigate the correlation between preferences. As we will describe 
in the next section, we tried to design this study in a way so as to address these concerns. 
Thus far, only a few other studies have combined laboratory experiments with field 
observations of the same individual in order to better understand the extent to which behavior in 
the lab is correlated with behavior in the real-world. Benz and Meier (2008) find that the 
correlation between contributions to the university “Social Fund” in a lab experiment and a real-
life setting is between 0.25 and 0.4. However, as the two situations are virtually identical, this 
result could be interpreted as the desire of students to be consistent in the eyes of the 
experimenter. Furthermore, it does not speak directly to the validity of inferring social 
preferences from standard economic games, since it does not use one.  
By contrast, we use a standard Berg et al. (1995) trust game, which differs substantially 
from our real-life setting. In doing so we are very similar to Karlan (2005), who correlates the 
responder behavior in the trust game to the repayment behavior with respect to a microloan. 
While Karlan (2005) documents that economic games capture some real-world traits, it does not 
identify what traits these are. Because the trust game was played face-to-face with other 
members of their community, individuals may return money in both circumstances out of 
concern for their reputations or fear of social sanctioning, not necessarily in order to reciprocate 
or because they are trustworthy. The paper that is most closely related to ours is Fehr and Leibbrandt (2008), who find 
that fishermen who are more cooperative and more patient in a lab setting are also less likely to 
exploit the communal fishing grounds in their daily lives (see also Carpenter and Seki, 2005). 
However, the main difference between the two papers is that they focus on cooperation while we 
focus on reciprocity.   
 
2.  Data 
In this paper, we utilize data from the Templeton-Chicago MBA longitudinal study (TCMLS). 
As part of a long-term research project on individual characteristics and economic success, the 
TCMLS collects data from the 2008 MBA cohort at the University of Chicago Booth School of 
Business (see Reuben et al., 2008).  
 
2.1 The Data Collection Process  
The TCMLS data collection process proceeded in several phases. The first phase started when 
the students first entered the school (September 2006). As part of a mandatory class, the students 
were asked to complete an extensive survey and to play, among other games, a trust game and a 
cooperation game.
2
Because of the mandatory nature of the class, almost all of the students participated: 544 
of the 550 MBA students participated in the games. To eliminate any coercive aspect the 
Institutional Review Board at the University of Chicago required that participants have the 
opportunity to opt out of the study by refusing consent to the use of all or parts of the data 
collected for publication. At the time of the game (October 2006), we also asked the students for 
their consent to collect information on their grades, their careers, and any other information 
amassed by the school development office. As a result, we were able to collect data on their 
donations to the school in the May 2008 Class Gift campaign.  
 The games were programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and played in 
four batches in four large classrooms. In order to give students an incentive to take their 
decisions seriously, they were paid according to their performance. One of the games was 
randomly drawn and participants were paid according to their earnings in that game. Students 
earned on average $78.32, in addition to a $20 show-up fee, which was paid in cash at the 
beginning of the session. 
                                                 
2 See Reuben et al., 2008 for a full description of all the procedures.  Other data was collected over the course of the two years that the MBA students were 
attending Chicago Booth (from September 2006 to May 2008). During this time, we sent out 
several questionnaires, each of which had various degrees of participation. From the point of 
view of this study, the most important is the Investment Profile Survey, where we asked students 
about their investment style and wealth.  
Out of the 550 MBA students, 473 consented to the use of the main variables in which we 
were interested. Of the 473 students, eleven either graduated early or late and thus did not 
graduate with their cohort in June 2008. As a result, they were not a part of the Class Gift 
campaign. Thus, the final sample size is 462, or 84% of the 550 MBA students.
3
In this paper, we concentrate on the games and the survey questions that are pertinent to 




2.2 The Trust Game 
To measure an individual’s degree of reciprocity, we use the participants’ behavior in the 
well-known trust game introduced in Kreps (1990) and Berg et al. (1995). In this game, a first 
mover is endowed with an amount of money y. The first mover decides how much to send, s ∈ 
[0, y], to a second mover. Any amount sent is multiplied by three. The second mover then 
decides how much to return, r ∈ [0, 3s], to the first mover. Consequently, the payoff of the first 
mover equals y – s + r, and that of the second mover equals 3s – r. The amount sent is frequently 
referred to as a measure of trust, whereas the amount returned as a measure of trustworthiness.
4
Each subject played the trust game twice, first in the role of the first mover and then in 
the role of the second mover. The two trust games were sequential and independent for all 
players. For each game, subjects were randomly re-matched so that for each decision was played 
with a different person. In order to have a complete measure of each subject’s reciprocity, 
subjects made their second-mover decision using the strategy method (Selten, 1967). That is, 
 
In our experiment, first movers were endowed with $50 and could send any multiple of $5.  
                                                 
3 We repeated all the analysis with the full sample of 544 students who participated and the results are qualitatively 
the same. 
4 For a discussion on whether this game really captures trust see Glaeser et al. (2000) and Cox (2004). they indicated how much to return for all ten possible amounts sent without knowing how much 
the first mover actually sent.
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The subjects’ earnings as the second mover were determined by randomly selecting one 
of these ten decisions. Then, the subjects’ earnings for the entire trust game were determined by 
randomly selecting whether the subjects would get paid for their first mover or second mover 
decision. The subjects were not given feedback regarding the behavior of other subjects in 
between decisions. Furthermore, when making a decision, participants did not know what future 
decisions they would be asked to make. However, subjects did know that their actions in one 
would not affect their payoff in the others. This design guarantees that all subjects make their 
decision in the same order and with the same information. Finally, to facilitate any calculations 
prior to submitting a decision, subjects could use two buttons that would automatically calculate 
both their payoff and the payoff for the other player, given their selected strategy.  
  
  In this paper, following an extensive body of literature (see Berg et al., 1995, McCabe et 
al., 1998, and Cox, 2004, for examples), we focus on the measure of reciprocity, i.e. the amount 
that the players return as the second mover in the game. The amount returned varies depending 
on the amount sent. Thus, we used the return ratio, which is the amount returned divided by the 
amount that was sent. Since the second mover receives the amount sent multiplied by three, the 
return ratio ranges from 0 to 3, where a value of 1 indicates that the second mover sent exactly 
what the first mover sent to them and a value of 1.5 indicates a 50:50 split of the total amount 
received by the second mover. Any value greater than 1 indicates that the second mover returned 
to the first mover an amount greater than they sent.  
Although we present a basic regression using the return ratio for all possible amounts sent 
by the first mover, most analyses use the return ratio when the first mover sends $50. We use this 
as the measure of reciprocity because $50 is the highest possible amount that the first player can 
send. As such it is also the amount that is most likely to induce the second player to reciprocate 
and respond in kind by returning a large amount. The difference in the return ratios for different 
amounts sent can be also seen in the data. While the average return ratio when the first mover 
                                                 
5 Although the use of the strategy method may elicit strategies that differ from those used in a strictly sequential environment, in 
games of low complexity, the strategy method seems to have little to no significant effect on subjects’ decisions (Brandts and 
Charness, 2000). In our context, Vyrastekova and Onderstal (2005) find that the strategy method has no significant effect on the 
behavior in the trust game. sent only $5 was 0.78, when the first mover sent their full endowment of $50, the average return 
ratio was 1.09. Thus, participants were more generous if the first mover was generous to them. 
  Figure (1) presents the distribution of return ratios when the first mover sends $50. The 
distribution is not normally distributed. There are several peaks at certain ratios, suggesting that 
individuals may be using rules of thumb to decide their level of reciprocity in the game. Fifty-six 
students returned zero when the first mover sent $50, 79 students had a return ratio of 1 and 97 
students had a return ratio of exactly 1.5. Thus, over 50% of the sample used explicit rules to 
decide the amount they would return in the trust game. To address the non-normality of the data, 
we also performed the analysis presented in this paper using an ordered probit model, without 
any significant difference in the results (results available upon request). 
In addition, to the return ratio it is possible to create several additional variables that 
capture the degree of reciprocity of a subject. The variable “# of times the subject returned less 
than was sent” is the number (out of ten possibilities) that the responder returned less than she 
was sent (return ratio less than one). “# of times returned zero” is the number of times (out of 10) 
that the subject return zero dollars to the first mover. The “Average Return Ratio” is the mean 
ratio across all amounts sent. The categorical variable “Reciprocator” equals 1 if a subject on 
average returned more than she was sent and zero otherwise.   
 
2.3 Class Gift Donation 
As Rothschild and White (1995) and Winston (1999) show, university students pay tuition below 
the cost of production and far below the benefit they receive. As a result, an alumnus finds 
himself in a situation similar to the one of a responder in the Berg et al. (1995) trust game, who is 
asked to “reciprocate” the nice gesture done by the sender. As Diamond and Kashyap (1997) 
show, this exchange relationship between alumni and the university is well understood by the 
former, who discuss it in focus groups. For these reasons, university donations are a good 
candidate to identify the real-life degree of the students’ reciprocity.  
Each spring, just before a cohort graduates, the Student Relations Office and 
Development Office begin a campaign encouraging the soon-to-be graduates to make a donation 
to the University of Chicago Booth School of Business (formerly the Graduate School of 
Business (GSB)). The Templeton Team was in no way involved in the campaign or the 
collection of this data. We received the data from the Student Relations Office after the 
campaign was complete. The original file contains information on the donations of all of the Spring 2008 graduating class.  However, only those subjects in the Templeton sample who 
consented to the use of their admissions and Chicago Booth administrative data were used in the 
analysis. However, the results were not significantly affected when the analysis was performed 
on the entire Templeton sample. 
The goal of the campaign is to foster generous alumni giving in the future. Therefore, this 
campaign focuses more on 100% participation than the dollar amount received. The students 
received emails about the class gift campaign and how to make a donation. In addition, there was 
a large marketing campaign with posters, emails, a website, giveaways, and puzzle. The 
marketing materials for the campaign featured caricatures of several popular faculty members. 
Lastly, the members of the Class Gift Committee usually staffed a table during lunch and other 
social events. At the table, the committee displayed the incentive gifts that the students could 
receive for making donations. The following items were available as incentives for the students:  
 
Leader's Circle 
($501 or more) 
Official Chicago GSB diploma frame, Class of 2008 Coasters featuring 
Chicago GSB Faculty, and Class of 2008 T-Shirt 
Scholar's Circle 
($208 to $500)  
Class of 2008 Coasters featuring Chicago GSB Faculty and Class of 2008 
T-Shirt 
Member's Circle 
($1 to $207)  
Class of 2008 T-Shirt 
 
 
The Class Gift relies heavily on peer-to-peer solicitation; thus, in addition to attending 
events and receiving emails, the students were directly contacted by their peers on the Class Gift 
Committee. The Class Gift Committee is comprised of 19 students from the class.  Each 
committee member is assigned approximately 30 students from the 2008 class from whom they 
were responsible for soliciting donations. The groups were not assigned randomly; the Class Gift 
Committee members usually had existing relationships with the people they contacted. Students who donated were acknowledged in the Dean’s Report that recognizes people 
who are Booth donors. However, the specific amount given by each student was not made 
public. Consequently, the only means by which the students can demonstrate how much they 
gave was via the giveaway prizes that they received since the giveaways (t-shirts, coasters, 
diploma frames) depended on the amount of one’s gift. 
Most students (94.8%) of the sample either paid outright or pledged a donation of at least 
$1. When the students made their donation, they had the option of either paying outright or 
pledging to pay their donation by December 31, 2008. Of the students who made a donation, 
47.7% paid their donation outright (N = 209) and 52.3% pledged their donation. The students 
who pledged their donation pledged to donate significantly more than those who paid outright 
($212.21 versus $108.46). The differences between these means is highly significant (Wilcoxin-
Mann-Whitney test, z = -10.113, p < 0.0000).  
Figure (2) shows the distribution of the Original Gift Amount. The distribution of 
donation amount is not normally distributed and the data could not be transformed. Most results 
are presented using standard parametric OLS regressions. However, our results are robust using 
non-parametric analyses. Donations tend to cluster around the minimum amount required to fall 
into a given category. For example, 15.5% of students (N = 68) who gave a donation gave 
exactly $501, the minimum donation required to receive all three gifts. Similarly, 13.5% of 
students (N = 59) gave $10 or less. Six students donated exactly $1. 
After December 31, 2008, we received the data on whether the students actually paid 
their pledges. In the end, 60.3% (N = 138) of the students who pledged to pay a donation 
defaulted on their pledge. This amounted to a total of $43,027 in defaulted pledges. No students 
partially defaulted—either the student paid the pledge in full or she did not pay it at all. Although 
pledged donations were higher than donations that were paid outright overall, there was no 
statistically significant difference between the average donations the students paid outright and 
the average donation received from pledged donations, taking into account the fact that students 
who defaulted paid zero (Wilcoxin-Mann-Whitney test, z = -1.095, p < 0.2734). However, 
students who paid their pledges paid significantly more on average ($273.60) than students who 
paid outright (Wilcoxin-Mann-Whitney test, z = -7.176, p < 0.0000). 
In this analysis, we use two measures of donation amount. “Original Gift Amount” is the 
initial amount donated by the student to the class gift. This variable includes the donation amount 
paid outright or pledged by the students. This can be thought of as the more public of the two donations. The mean Original Gift Amount is $194.32 (standard deviation = 212.05). “Final Gift 
Amount” is the actual amount donated, which includes the donation amount if paid outright or if 
the pledge was paid, and zero if the student defaulted on their pledge or did not make a donation. 
The mean Final Gift Amount is $101.19 (standard deviation = 167.05).  
It is important to note that there were no penalties for failing to pay a pledge as the 
Student Relations and Development Offices are interested in maintaining positive relationships 
with alumni. Thus, failure to pay resulted in no monetary consequences and the only people who 
knew the students failed to pay were individuals directly involved in the campaign and 
researchers in this study. After speaking with individuals in the Alumni Relations Office, they 
indicated that there was some anecdotal evidence that certain individuals were unable to pay 
their pledge because they lost their job as a result of the financial crisis. In only two cases did 
these individuals directly contact the office to indicate their inability to pay. Which individuals 
were subject to more financial constraints as a result of the financial crisis was not included in 
the analysis, as the evidence was largely hearsay. This may have decreased our likelihood of 
obtaining significant results, as otherwise altruistic/reciprocal individuals may have been unable 
to follow through with their pledge as a result of exogenous factors. 
 
2.3 Other Variables 
From the students’ admissions data we obtain several demographic variables (i.e. gender, 
ethnicity, citizenship status, and pre-admission salary). The TCMLS sample is extremely diverse. 
Just less than 30% of the sample is female. Forty-five percent of the students in the sample are 
white, 16% are East Asian, 7% are black, 7% are Hispanic, 19% are South or other Asian and 
6% are categorized as other. Thirty-eight percent of the students are international students.  
  We also have information on their parents’ education and, more importantly, the 
students’ score on the “social desirability index”. The social desirability scale measures the 
importance individuals give to doing or saying what they consider to be socially desirable.  This 
scale has been used to measure how prone the subject is to both manage others’ impressions of 
them and to deceive themselves regarding the extent to which they do what is socially desirable, 
both in experimental and field settings (Paulhus, 1984; Rosenthal, 1969). We used a shortened 
questionnaire of the Crowne-Marlowe social desirability scale (Crowne and Marlowe, 1960), 
which we call the ‘social desirability index’ to distinguish it from the longer version. The 
subjects were asked a series of ten true or false questions, such as “My table manners at home are always as good as when I eat out in a restaurant,” or “I have never been irked when people 
expressed ideas very different from my own,” in which a response of true is likely to be a lie that 
indicates that the subject has a strong desire to say what they think others want to hear.  The 
greater the social desirability index, the more the subject feels the pressure to conform to social 
norms. In order to select a set of questions, we ran a pre-test of the survey and picked the 
questions that were least correlated with each other and thus maximize the variation between 
subjects. Of the 10 questions, the students answered ‘true’ to an average of 3.42 questions with a 
standard deviation of 1.96.  The mode number of ‘true’ answers was 3.  Only 15.2% of the 
sample answered ‘true’ to 6 or more questions.   
One potential confounding factor in university donations is the difference in wealth 
among individuals. This problem is minimized here given that all the subjects are MBAs at the 
beginning of their career. Nevertheless, to account for differences in their accumulated wealth, 
we use self-reported financial wealth as a control on the small sub-sample of students that 
participated in the Investment Profile Survey. The students were asked “What is the approximate 
value of your investment accounts (excluding retirement accounts)?” and could choose between 
several categories: $0 - $30,000; $30,000-$60,000; $60,000-$100,000; $100,000-$150,000; 
$150,000-$200,000; $200,000-$300,000; I prefer not say; and I don’t know. Eighty-three 
students provided a numerical estimate of their accumulated wealth. The modal response to this 
question was $0 - $30,000, the median was $30,000-$60,000, and the mean wealth (using the 
average of the ranges) was $98,070. 
  To control for differences in expected wealth, we use data on the final job offers for the 
graduating MBA obtained from Career Services office at the University of Chicago Booth 
School of Business. This data set included detailed information about the position, firm, and 
salary of the offers, as well as whether or not the student accepted the offer. The final data was 
audited, meaning that the observations were double-checked by Career Services. The mean 
accepted job offer salary was $164,536 and the median was $153,150. Table (1) shows the 
summary statistics for the data used in this paper. In addition, we obtained the students pre-
admission salary from their application to the MBA program. The average pre-admission salary 
was approximately $65,000 (standard deviation = $31,000). We also obtained the students’ 
G.P.A. upon graduation (mean 3.31, standard deviation = 0.35). 
   
  3. Empirical Results 
3.1 Main Specification  
To test the link between the behavior in the lab and the behavior in the field, we correlated the 
amount donated to the University with the fraction of money returned by the responder in the 
trust game. Since the subjects in the trust game played with the strategy method, we have ten 
conditional responses that can be used as a measure of reciprocity. Reciprocal behavior, 
however, is maximally elicited when the sender sends the highest possible amount. If the amount 
of the donation is capturing reciprocity, then the correlation between the amount donated to the 
University and the return ratio in the trust game should be larger when the first mover sends $50 
versus when the first mover sends only $5.   
As Table (2) shows, this conjecture is supported by the data. For low amounts sent (less 
or equal than 20), the return ratio is borderline statistically significant at the 10% level and a one 
standard deviation increase in the return ratio corresponds to only a $17 increase in the amount 
given or pledged at the time of the fundraising. As we move toward higher amounts sent, the 
effect of the return ratio becomes stronger both statistically and economically. A one standard 
deviation increase in the return ratio at $50 is associated with a $28 increase in the donation and 
this effect is statistically different from zero at the 1% level. Given that the return ratio at $50 is a 
better proxy for reciprocity, we will use this ratio in all our subsequent analysis.  
Table (3) further explores the relationship between the return ratio in the trust game and 
the amount donated.  In the first three columns, as measure of donation to the University we use 
the amount given or pledged at the time of the fundraising campaign (May 2008), as in Table (2). 
The difference with respect to Table (2) is that we now control for other potential determinants 
of donation. In Column (1), we insert a dummy variable equal to one if the donation was pledged 
rather than paid outright. This variable is highly economically and statistically significant. 
Students who give their donation as a pledge promise to donate two times as much as those who 
pay their donation outright. This control, however, does not reduce the impact of our reciprocity 
variable measured in the lab. In fact, the coefficient increases by 20 percent when the control is 
added. In Column (2), we insert two additional dummies; one for whether the student is a 
member of the Class Gift fundraising committee and the second, for whether the student is a 
LEAD facilitator, i.e. she was chosen to instruct and coordinate a series of social and learning 
activities for a group of students in the younger cohort (the 2009 cohort). Fundraising committee 
members clearly face a social pressure to lead by example, donating a higher amount. A similar story can be said for the thirty-four LEAD facilitators who, while not directly in charge of 
fundraising, play a leadership role in the Booth community. We find that in both cases, these 
additional motives significantly add to the amount donated. Committee members donate twice as 
much as regular students, while LEAD facilitators give 50 percent more than regular students. 
These controls have no effect on the return ratio.  
Finally, in Column (3), we control for other demographic characteristics that may affect 
donation: gender, race, US Citizenship (on the premise that US students are more used to charity 
and donations), GPA (on the premise that people with a higher GPA may have benefitted more 
from the school and so may donate more), and whether the father had higher education (as a 
proxy of wealth or entitlement). Of all these variables, only US Citizenship and father’s 
education turn out to be significant at conventional levels. Surprisingly, however, they both have 
a negative coefficient. As we will discuss in the following pages these results do not hold when 
we adjust our measure of donation. The important result is that the coefficient on return ratio is 
unchanged.  
Since the decision to contribute in cash is different from the decision to pledge 
(especially given that 60 percent of the people who pledged defaulted), in Columns (4) to (6), we 
restrict our analysis to the students who paid their gift in cash at the time of the fundraising 
campaign. The correlation between the behavior as a responder in the trust game and the 
donation amount is almost the same as before. By contrast, when we restrict the sample to people 
who pledged but defaulted, the coefficient of the return ratio in the trust game drops by half and 
becomes statistically insignificant. This result is not surprising if we think that people who 
pledged and defaulted are a combination of people who intended to donate, but forgot or were 
severely affected by the financial crisis, and people who from the beginning pledged with the 
intention of not following through their pledge.  
Finally, in Columns (10)-(12), we use as the dependent variable the final gift amount, 
which equals the amount actually paid either in May or in December when the pledge was due. 
Obviously, we set the amount equal to zero for those who defaulted on their pledge. The results 
are very similar to the ones in Columns (1) to (3); in fact, the coefficient of the return ratio is 
almost identical (only the standard deviation of the coefficient is slightly lower). By contrast, the 
coefficients and statistical significance of the other control variables are quite different: 
committee members and lead facilitators do not appear to donate significantly more, while 
women donate significantly less, and people with a higher GPA significantly more.    Since the final gift amount is the actual amount donated, from now on—unless otherwise 
specified—we will use this variable as the measure of donation.  
 
3.2 Controlling for Wealth  
  One of the limitations of our results is that we have not controlled for wealth, a variable 
that standard economic theory suggests would affect donations. It is possible, albeit unlikely, that 
the reciprocal behavior in the trust game is correlated with how wealthy a student is, which may 
also affect his or her willingness to donate at the end of the program.  
  This problem is reduced, but not eliminated, by the fact that all the subjects are students 
in the same program at the same stage in their career. To try to address this problem more 
directly, we present here some regressions that control for several proxies we have of their 
wealth and income. Unfortunately, we have this information only for a subset of students, so we 
lose both sample size and power.  
  Columns (1) and (2) in Table (4) show the effect of controlling for wealth. As previously 
mentioned, 83 of the 163 students who participated in a survey regarding their portfolio 
investment in the spring of 2008 responded to the question regarding their wealth. As Column 
(2) shows wealth does not predict donations and does not affect the coefficient of the return ratio. 
  In Columns (3) and (4), we control for the salary these MBAs expect to receive after 
graduation (i.e., starting the month following their donation). Note that this salary was not known 
at the time the game was played, but was known at the time the donation was made. The salary 
amount does not affect the amount donated and does not alter the coefficient of the return ratio. 
  In Columns (5) and (6), we control for the salary these MBAs had before they entered 
into the program. This salary is a better indication of the level of wealth these people had coming 
in the program. Once again, the level of salary does not affect the amount of donation and does 
not alter the coefficient of the return ratio. 
  In the subsequent columns, we combine these proxies of wealth.  Obviously, the size of 
the sample is further reduced. In Columns (7) and (8), we control both for the declared measure 
of wealth and the exit salary. These controls do not affect the amount of donation and do not 
alter the coefficient of the return ratio, although the statistical significance drops to only 10% due 
to the size of the sample.   
  In Columns (9) and (10), we control for the declared measure of wealth, the exit salary 
and the entry salary. In this reduced sample, the return ratio is not statistically significant, even when we do not control for these measures of wealth.  Nevertheless, it is important to point out 
that the coefficient of the return ratio is virtually unchanged when we add these controls, a sign 
that the size of the coefficient itself is not due to an omitted variable correlated with wealth. The 
same story applies when we control for the other determinants of donations studied in Table (3) 
(see Columns (11) and (12)). Overall, there is no evidence that the effect of the return ratio on 
the amount of donations is due to our failure to control properly for wealth.  
 
3.3 Robustness to Alternative Measures of Reciprocity from the Trust Game  
  So far we have chosen one particular measure of the responder behavior in the trust game 
as a measure of reciprocity. Given that we used the strategy method, we have several 
hypothetical responses for each player and, hence, we could potentially use other measures.  
In Table (5), we experiment with these alternative measures. One reciprocity measure, 
shown in Column (1), was the number of cases in which the responder returns less than what the 
sender sent him. A higher number here indicates less reciprocal behavior. Consistently, we find 
that the number of times that a subject returned less than they were sent is negatively correlated 
with the amount donated to the Class Gift and this correlation is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. In Column (2), we measure reciprocity as the number of cases in which the responder 
returns a zero amount. Once again, a higher number here indicates less reciprocal behavior. 
Similarly, we find that the more often the subject returns zero in the Trust Game, the less she 
donated and this effect is statistically significant at the 10% level. In Column (3), we use the 
average return ratio across all possible sent amounts as the reciprocity. Not surprisingly (since 
this is an average of the regressions in Table (2)) the effect is positive and statistically significant 
at the 1% level. Finally, in Column (4) we use as our measure of reciprocity, Reciprocator, a 
dummy variable equal to one if the subject on average (across all the possible amounts sent) 
returned more than what was sent to him. Once again, this measure of reciprocity has a positive 
and statistically significant effect on donations.   
In Columns (5) to (8), we repeat the same exercises inserting our preferred measure of 
reciprocity: the return ratio when the amount sent is $50. As Table (5) shows, while the return 
ratio remains statistically significant, all the other measures do not. Hence, we conclude the 
return ratio when the first mover sends $50 is the best measure of reciprocity.  
 3.4 Reciprocity vs. Other Measures of Prosocial Behavior  
  Is reciprocity just one facet of a general prosocial behavior or does it represent a separate 
dimension, independent from others? To answer this question, we explore the richness of the 
TCMLS and test whether other measures of prosocial behavior have similar predictive power.  
  We assess the relationship between donation behavior and cooperative behavior shown in 
an 8-person prisoner dilemma (for a full description of this game see Reuben et al., 2008). The 
choice most related to reciprocity is the decision to cooperate conditional on the seven other 
players cooperating. We are able to identify this possibility because we have the subjects play 
with the strategy method so we can ask them how they would play conditional on the other seven 
players cooperating. We create a dummy variable equal to 1 if they answer they would 
cooperate. As Columns (1) to (3) of Table (6) show, this variable is not correlated with the 
amount donated. The coefficient is negative, which is opposite of what we would expect, but it 
never reaches statistical significance. In Columns (4) to (6) we repeat the same exercise by using 
instead the decision to cooperate regardless of the other players’ decision. So the variable 
Unconditional Cooperation equals one if a subjects chooses to cooperate regardless of the other 
players’ decision. The effect of this variable on the amount donated goes in the expected 
direction, but it is never statistically significant.  
 
4. The Effect of Social Desirability  
Levitt and List (2007) claim that the lab evidence is distorted by the so-called experimenter 
effect (i.e. subjects’ tendency to follow subtle and involuntary cues provided by the experimenter 
and therefore behave in the way the experimenter desires). They suggest that this effect will lead 
individuals to behave more prosocially in the lab than they otherwise would in the field. The 
tendency to “act” in a way that pleases others is not unique to the lab, but it could affect the 
behavior in the field as well. The extent to which subjects modify their behavior to look good 
depends on two factors: 1) how much they feel compelled to please others, and 2) how important 
the opinion of the observers is to them.  
In the psychology literature, individual differences in the tendency to please others have 
been measured with the Crowne-Marlowe (1960) social desirability scale.  Since, ceteris 
paribus, prosocial behavior will be more pronounced among people who more like to please 
others, we will use the Crowne-Marlowe (1960) social desirability scale to test how much 
behavior is distorted by the scrutiny of different audiences. As far as the audience is concerned, there are important differences.  In the trust game (as in every anonymous lab game), the only 
observer is the experimenter.  By contrast, in the donation, we must distinguish between the 
pledged amount, which is observed by the experimenter, the alumni development officials, and 
the other students, and the actual donation amount (if different from the pledged), which is only 
visible to the experimenter and the alumni development officials.    
   Therefore, the most likely situation in which prosocial behavior is affected by the 
audience is the original donation amount. For this reason, in Columns (1) to (3) of Table (7A) we 
analyze whether the original donation amount is correlated with the social desirability index. As 
we can see, students with a higher social desirability index do donate more, at least if we count 
the full value of the pledges. In columns (4) to (6) we repeat the exercise by replacing the 
original donation amount with the actual donation amount. In this case we find no correlation. 
The difference between the original donation and the final donation is that the latter is only 
observed by the development officers (and us), while the former is also observed by the fellow 
students.  The observed difference in correlation suggests that students’ prosocial behavior is not 
sensitive to being observed by the school’s staff and faculty, but it is sensitive to being observed 
by their peers.  This finding is consistent with Glazer and Konrad (1996) who suggest that 
wealth/status seeking individuals are subject to social pressure to make charitable donations as a 
signal to their peers. It appears that it is this pressure that makes them pledge large sums, but 
subsequently fail to follow through at a time when their peers cannot observe their actions.    
  Having established that the social desirability index is a good measure of the pressure 
subjects feel to please others, in Columns (7) to (9), we test whether this pressure exists in the 
lab. As Table (7A) shows, there is no effect of the social desirability index on the amount 
returned by the receiver in the trust game. Individuals who score high on social desirability do 
not return more (or less) in the trust game. Given that the sender is unaware of who they have 
been paired with, this is not entirely surprising. However, it suggests that the desire to do what 
they consider to be socially desirable does not significantly influence their behavior in the lab. 
In Table (7B), we show that our main results in Table (3) are robust to inserting the social 
desirability index. As in 7A, it is still the case that the social desirability index has an effect on 
the original donation amount (Columns (1) to (3)), but not on the final donation amount 
(Columns (4) to (6)). Furthermore, the coefficient and significance of the effect of the return 
ratio on the donation amount is nearly identical to our main results in Table (3). In sum, we find no evidence that prosocial behaviors are exaggerated in the lab. In fact, 
87.9 % of the students return something in the trust game, while 94.8 % donate at least a dollar in 
the fund raising campaign. However, we do find evidence that the identity of the people 
watching has an effect on behavior. The fact that nearly 95% of the students donate when other 
students are watching, but only 65% end up donating when just the school is watching shows 
that students are much more sensitive to the social pressure coming from their peers than from 
their school. To the extent the subjects remembered that their donation data could also be 
observed by the experimenters, we can also conclude that they do not seem to distort their 
behavior to please the experimenter.  
If prosocial behavior is accentuated by peer scrutiny, we would expect that a selfish 
person with a high level of social desirability be more likely to pledge high amounts, but also 
more likely to default on the pledge. To explore this issue, Table (8) (and Figure (3)) presents a 
cross-tabulation that divides the sample into “economists” (individuals who returned zero when 
they were sent $50 in the trust game, i.e. the economically-rational decision) and “non-
economists” who return a positive amount. It also divides the sample into individuals who are 
above the median versus at or below the median in social desirability. In general, “economists” 
give significantly less than “non-economists,” both in the original gift amount and the final gift 
amount (Wilcoxin Mann-Whitney test: z = 1.1918, p ≤ 0.0552; z = 2.082, p ≤ 0.0373, 
respectively).  Furthermore, as predicted, “economists” who score above the median on the 
social desirability index promise to pay an average of $186.61, but end up paying only $43.75. 
This difference between the original and final gift amounts is largest for “economists” with high 
social desirability, which is exactly what we would predict. 
6
Our findings suggest that Levitt and List (2007) are correct to worry about possible 
distortions in prosocial behavior due to the subjects’ desire to look good in the eyes of observers.  
However, their conjecture that these effects are most pronounced in the lab, does not seem to be 
supported by our data. Only future research will be able to determine how general this result is. It 
 
                                                 
6 Consistent with the analysis of Frank et al. (1993), who suggest that economically-rational thinking and training in 
economics may translate into selfish behavior in both the lab and the field, MBA students whose undergraduate 
major was economics were more likely to behave like “economists” in the lab (18.9% versus 10.3%), a difference 
that is statistically significant at the 5% level. Economics majors also donated slightly less, but the difference was 
not statistically significant (Wilcoxin Mann-Whitney test: z = 1.397, p ≤ 0.1625). 
 is possible that MBA students are different from the typical undergraduate lab subjects in that 
they care less about looking good in the eyes of their professors. Still, our findings provide a 
method to test this conjecture: check whether prosocial behavior is correlated with the Crowne-
Marlowe (1960) social desirability scale.  
   
5. Conclusions     
The main contribution of this paper is to show that measures of social preferences derived in the 
lab have external validity. In fact, the predictive power of these measures is very high if 
compared with the existing psychological literature. Mischel’s (1968) review of the personality 
assessment literature concluded that correlations between behaviors in similar environments is 
rarely larger than 0.30. We find that the correlation between behaviors in completely different 
environments exhibits a correlation of 0.29. However, as our analysis suggests, the secret is to 
create laboratory experiments that closely identify the fundamental trait (in this case reciprocity) 
that one is interested in. Generalized “prosocial behavior” is too wide a category—people might 
exhibit reciprocity, but not cooperate unconditionally and vice versa.  
The second result of this paper is to show that lab experiments are not necessarily 
distorted by an experimenter effect. In fact, we find that our field data exhibit greater distortions 
due to social pressure than our lab experiment.  One question our findings raise is how 
generalizeable these results are. We might not have found an experimenter effect because the 
particular design of our experiment (large experiment, composed of multiple games, 
administered within a class, played with a computer, etc.), which may have reduced the influence 
of the experimenter in shaping subject behavior. Only future research will be able to tell, but the 
Crowne-Marlowe social desirability scale appears to be an interesting instrument to further test 
whether pressure to behave in a certain way influences behavior in the lab. 
Finally, our results provide evidence of the existence and pervasiveness of other-
regarding preferences. The fact that 87.9% of Chicago MBAs (among the most rational, 
competitive and money-driven people in the world) return a positive amount in the trust game 
and 83.8% return at least 30% of what was sent to them suggests that social preferences are 
widespread even among business people and that economic models must take these preferences 
into serious consideration.  References 
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This plots the distribution of the amount returned (in dollars) by the 
second mover in a Berg et al. (1995) Trust Game when the first 
mover sent $50.   
     
Figure 2: Distribution of Donations to the Class Gift 
 
This plot reports the distribution of the amounts donated (in dollars) 
to the Class Gift.  Reference lines have been added to the cut points 
beyond which the donor received reward, i.e. at $1, $208, and $501. Figure 3: “Economists” and the Social Desirability Index 
 
This figure presents the cross-tabulations of the mean gift amounts for both the Original Gift 
Amount and Final Gift Amount, divided by the behavior in the Berg et al. (1995) Trust Game 
and the level of Social Desirability Index. We classify as individuals as “Economist” if they 
behave in the trust game according to how economic theory suggests (i.e. return $0). We classify 
as individuals as “Non-Economist” if they return a positive amount and above or below median 
in social desirability scale. This figure illustrates graphically the tabulations in Table (8).  Table 1: Summary Statistics: 
 
Panel A reports the summary statistics for all the variables used in this paper. Original Gift Amount is the initial 
amount donated or pledged by the student to the class gift. Final Gift Amount is the actual amount of the donation, 
which corresponds to the donation amount if paid outright or the pledge was fulfilled, and zero if the student either 
did not make a donation or if the student defaulted on her pledge. Donation Category is the incentive category into 
which a student's initial donation falls (equal to 1 if the subject made no donation; equal to 2 if the subject donated 
between $1 and $207; equal to 3 if the subject donated between $208 and $500; equal to 4 if the subject donated 
$501 or more). Donation Pledged is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject pledged to pay a donation by 
December 31, 2008 rather than paying it outright and equal to zero otherwise. Return ratio if the first mover sends 
$5 is the ratio between the amount returned and the amount sent when the first mover sends $5. The same applies to 
Return ratio when the first mover sends $10 through Return ratio when the first mover sends $50. # of times the 
subject returned less than was sent is the number of times (out of 10) that the student returned less than the first 
mover sent. # of times the subject returned zero is the sum (out of 10) of the number of times that the subject 
returned zero. Average Return Ratio is the mean return ratio across all possible amounts sent. Reciprocator is a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject, on average, returned more than was sent to her. Unconditional 
Cooperative Type is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject chose to cooperate and zero if the subject 
chose to defect in an 8-person Prisoner's Dilemma game, regardless of the other players' strategies. Conditional 
Cooperative Type is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject chose to cooperate and zero if the subject 
chose to defect if all the other players are cooperating in an 8-person Prisoner's Dilemma game. Committee Member 
is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject was a member of the Class Gift fundraising committee. LEAD 
Facilitator is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject was a facilitator in the Leadership Effectiveness and 
Development class. Female is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject is female and zero if the subject is 
male. Race Black is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject is black and zero otherwise. U.S. Citizen is a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject is a citizen of the United States and zero otherwise. GPA is the 
student's final grade point average in the MBA program. Father B.A. or higher is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 
if the father has a bachelor's degree or above and zero otherwise. Estimated wealth is the self-reported value of the 
students' personal wealth. Accepted Job Offer Salary is the post-graduation salary in thousands of dollars for job 
offer accepted by the student. Pre-Admission Salary is the salary reported by the student on the admission 
application. Social Desirability Index is a variable equal to the number of times (out of 10) the subject indicated true 
on our shortened version of the Crowne-Marlowe social desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). 
 
Panel B shows the break down of how students made their donations and the summary statistics of the original gift 
amount in each category.  
Panel A 
   Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Obs 
Measures of Donation              
Original Gift Amount ($)  194.32  100  212.05  0  1080  462 
Final Gift Amount ($)  101.19  25  167.05  0  1000  462 
Donation Category (1-4)  2.57  2  0.90  1  4  462 
Donation Pledged (Yes=1)  0.50  0  0.50  0  1  462 
Defaulted on Pledged Donation  0.60  1  0.49  0  1  229 
Measures of Trustworthiness              
Return ratio if first mover sent $5  0.78  1  0.70  0  3  462 
Return ratio if first mover sent $10  0.81  1  0.69  0  3  462 
Return ratio if first mover sent $15  0.85  1  0.63  0  3  462 
Return ratio if first mover sent $20  0.93  1  0.60  0  3  462 
Return ratio if first mover sent $25  0.98  1  0.56  0  3  462 
Return ratio if first mover sent $30  1.02  1  0.56  0  3  462 
Return ratio if first mover sent $35  1.04  1.14  0.56  0  3  462 
Return ratio if first mover sent $40  1.05  1.13  0.57  0  3  462 
Return ratio if first mover sent $45  1.05  1.11  0.58  0  3  462 
Return ratio if first mover sent $50  1.09  1.2  0.60  0  3  462 
# of times the subject returned less than was sent  3.70  3  3.93  0  10  462 
# of times returned zero  1.58  0  2.96  0  10  462 
Average Return Ratio  0.96  1  0.53  0  3  462 
Reciprocator (1 = returns more, on average, than was sent)  0.54  1  0.50  0  1  462 
Measures of Cooperation              
Unconditional Cooperative Type  0.32  0  0.47  0  1  462 
Conditional Cooperative Type, when 7 other players cooperate  0.49  0  0.50  0  1  462 
Other Variables              
Committee Member  0.04  0  0.19  0  1  462 
LEAD Facilitator  0.07  0  0.26  0  1  462 
Female  0.29  0  0.46  0  1  462 
Race Black  0.06  0  0.25  0  1  462 
U.S. Citizen  0.62  1  0.49  0  1  462 
G.P.A.  3.31  3.31  0.35  2.48  4.05  461 
Father B.A. or higher  0.85  1  0.36  0  1  462 
Estimated Wealth ($1000)  98.07  45  161.55  15  650  83 
Accepted Job Offer Salary ($1000)  164.54  153.15  67.20  45  830  372 
Pre-Admission Salary  64.64  65.92  31.03  0  300  386 
Social Desirability Index  3.42  3  1.96  0  10  462 
             
Panel B 
   Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Obs 
No Donation  0  0  0  0  0  24 
Paid Outright  108.46  50  145.06  1  640  209 
Pledged and Paid  273.60  208  222.12  5  1000  91 
Pledged and Defaulted  305.87  250  228.85  1  1080  138 
 Table 2: Original Class Gift Donation as Function of Amount Returned in the Trust Game 
This table shows the OLS estimates of a linear regression model where the dependent variable is the Original Gift Amount. Return ratio if the first mover sends $5 is the 
ratio between the amount returned and the amount sent when the first mover sends $5. The same applies to Return ratio when the first mover sends $10 through Return 
ratio when the first mover sends $50. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1% 
                     
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Return ratio if first mover sends 5  24.78*                    
(13.35)                    
Return ratio if first mover sends 10    19.85                  
  (13.35)                  
Return ratio if first mover sends 15      25.73*                
    (14.24)                
Return ratio if first mover sends 20        28.01*              
      (15.17)              
Return ratio if first mover sends 25          36.04**            
        (16.35)            
Return ratio if first mover sends 30            39.96**          
          (16.12)          
Return ratio if first mover sends 35              41.01**        
            (16.07)        
Return ratio if first mover sends 40                43.54***      
              (16.02)      
Return ratio if first mover sends 45                  43.00***    
                (15.67)    
Return ratio if first mover sends 50                    46.24*** 
                  (15.17) 
Constant  165.95***  169.20***  163.54***  159.27***  150.10***  144.39***  142.62***  139.76***  140.03***  135.13*** 
   (13.30)  (13.74)  (14.61)  (16.42)  (17.98)  (18.48)  (18.81)  (18.71)  (18.48)  (18.45) 
Observations  463  463  463  463  463  463  463  463  463  463 
R-squared  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02 
 Table 3: Determinants of Donation 
This table shows the OLS estimates of a linear regression model using donation amount as the dependent variable. Columns 1-3 report the regression using the Original Gift 
Amount as the dependent variable.  Columns 4-6 report the regression using the Original Gift Amount as the dependent variable for only students who paid their gift outright. 
Columns 7-9 report the regression using the Original Gift Amount as the dependent variable for only students who pledged their donation and subsequently defaulted. 
Columns 10-12 report the regression using the Final Gift Amount as the dependent variable. Original Gift Amount is the initial amount donated or pledged by the student to 
the class gift. Final Gift Amount is the actual amount of the donation, which corresponds to the donation amount if paid outright or the pledge was fulfilled, and zero if the 
student either did not make a donation or if the student defaulted on her pledge. Return ratio if the first mover sends $50 is the ratio between the amount returned and the 
amount sent when the first mover sends $50. Donation Pledged is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject pledged to pay a donation by December 31, 2008 rather 
than paying it outright and equal to zero otherwise. Committee Member is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject was a member of the Class Gift fundraising 
committee. LEAD Facilitator is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject was a facilitator in the Leadership Effectiveness and Development class. Female is a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject is female and zero if the subject is male. Race Black is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject is black and zero 
otherwise. U.S. Citizen is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject is a citizen of the United States and zero otherwise. GPA is the student's final grade point average 
in the MBA program. Father B.A. or higher is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the father has a bachelor's degree or above and zero otherwise. Heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% *** significant at 0.1% 
                         
  
Original Gift Amount  Original Gift Amount if Paid 
Outright 
Original Gift Amount if 
Defaulted on Pledge 
Final Gift Amount 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10  (11)  (12) 
Return ratio when first 
mover sends $50 
55.30***  56.42***  55.53***  58.68***  55.86***  57.54***  19.59  27.74  22.29  52.66***  52.85***  55.07*** 
(14.71)  (14.61)  (14.74)  (13.95)  (14.09)  (14.54)  (34.47)  (34.21)  (34.24)  (12.40)  (12.49)  (12.54) 
Donation Pledged 
(Yes = 1) 
193.98***  187.38***  189.06***                         
(17.34)  (17.05)  (17.25)                         
Committee Member    182.79***  188.90***     208.04*  206.19*     133.34**  108.69     43.09  63.42 
  (51.80)  (51.26)     (107.91)  (110.31)     (64.82)  (65.73)     (57.78)  (56.65) 
LEAD Facilitator    91.62**  92.97**     40.92  42.20     143.26**  168.54**     29.87  27.24 
  (36.56)  (37.79)     (47.49)  (50.29)     (70.20)  (74.60)     (35.78)  (36.66) 
Female      -12.39       -2.27       43.22       -27.89* 
    (18.85)       (18.24)       (44.57)       (16.00) 
Race Black      13.58       -45.03       30.11       -46.76* 
       (36.67)       (29.94)       (63.19)       (26.51) 
U.S. Citizen      -38.24**       -31.77*       -87.03**       -7.53 
       (17.90)       (18.14)       (42.54)       (15.56) 
G.P.A.      7.02       33.40       -22.37       32.73 
       (25.60)       (25.42)       (65.41)       (24.14) 
Father B.A. or higher      -49.94**       -3.71       -72.42       -17.79 
    (24.43)       (24.39)       (61.64)       (22.31) 
Constant  38.11**  26.70  71.45  34.49**  30.77**  -59.50  284.65***  252.72***  428.99*  44.00***  40.00***  -40.22 
(16.71)  (16.39)  (88.47)  (14.29)  (14.42)  (80.41)  (39.47)  (39.49)  (230.73)  (13.02)  (13.23)  (81.19) 
Observations  462  462  461  233  233  233  138  138  137  462  462  461 
R-squared  0.238  0.283  0.297  0.061  0.110  0.133  0.003  0.070  0.125  0.036  0.041  0.061 Table 4: The Impact of Wealth and Income on Final Donation Amount 
This table shows the OLS estimates of a linear regression model where the dependent variable is the Final Gift Amount, controlling for different measures of wealth. For each 
measure of wealth, we run the regression with the variable and without it for the sample for which the measure of wealth is available. Columns 1 and 2 perform the regressions 
using Estimated Wealth as the control. Estimated wealth is the self-reported value of the students' personal wealth. Columns 3 and 4 use the Accepted Job Offer Salary as a 
control. Accepted Job Offer Salary is the post-graduation salary in thousands of dollars for job offer accepted by the student. Columns 5 and 6 use the Pre-Admission Salary as 
a control. Pre-Admission Salary is the salary reported by the student on the admission application. Columns 7 and 8 use both Estimated Wealth and Accepted Job Offer Salary 
as controls. Columns 9 and 10 use all three measures of wealth as controls. Columns 11 and 12 perform the same regressions as in 9 and 10, but with controls. For other 
variables, see Appendix 1. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% *** significant at 0.1% 
                         
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
  
Estimated Wealth  Accepted Job Offer 
Salary 
Pre-Admission Salary  Both Wealth and 





Salary, Pre-Salary, plus 
Controls 
Return ratio when first 
mover sends $50 
68.02**  68.76**  54.75***  54.75***  50.47***  50.65***  57.09*  52.93*  51.14  48.74  46.52  53.10 
(31.14)  (31.24)  (14.36)  (14.38)  (13.56)  (13.71)  (30.08)  (29.97)  (30.87)  (31.07)  (35.03)  (36.30) 
Estimated Wealth 
($1000) 
   0.03                 -0.05     -0.06     -0.00 
   (0.13)                 (0.11)     (0.15)     (0.16) 
Accepted Job Offer 
Salary ($1000) 
         0.03           -0.45     -0.32     -0.76* 
         (0.10)           (0.27)     (0.26)     (0.40) 
Pre-Admission Salary 
($1000) 
               0.40           0.01     -0.54 
               (0.28)           (0.51)     (0.64) 
Committee Member                                -86.62*  -81.04 
                              (47.74)  (55.67) 
LEAD Facilitator                                14.82  37.17 
                              (40.34)  (50.62) 
Female                                -91.89**  -110.74** 
                              (38.74)  (44.00) 
Race Black                                -15.41  -1.67 
                                 (41.23)  (56.87) 
U.S. Citizen                                25.60  50.65 
                                 (42.07)  (47.48) 
G.P.A.                                -59.85  -41.38 
                                 (70.33)  (68.06) 
Father B.A. or higher                                -59.53  -93.86 
                              (77.06)  (79.00) 
Constant  72.59**  69.07**  49.56***  44.78*  46.26***  20.29  75.08**  159.23***  81.84***  143.86**  344.36  459.96* 
(29.71)  (32.65)  (15.63)  (22.94)  (14.05)  (23.34)  (29.65)  (57.79)  (30.06)  (62.23)  (252.52)  (272.36) 
Observations  83  83  372  372  386  386  74  74  65  65  65  65 
R-squared  0.043  0.044  0.036  0.036  0.032  0.037  0.037  0.058  0.029  0.043  0.113  0.164 Table 5: Breakdown of Relationship between Trust Game Outcomes and Donation 
This table shows the OLS estimates of a linear regression model where the dependent variable is the Final Gift Amount.  # of 
times the subject returned less than was sent is the number of times (out of 10) that the student returned less than the first 
mover sent. # of times the subject returned zero is the sum (out of 10) of the number of times that the subject returned zero. 
Average Return Ratio is the mean return ratio across all possible amounts sent. Reciprocator is a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 if the subject, on average, returned more than was sent to her. Donation Pledged is a dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 if the subject pledged to pay a donation by December 31, 2008 rather than paying it outright and equal to zero otherwise. 
Committee Member is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject was a member of the Class Gift fundraising 
committee. LEAD Facilitator is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject was a facilitator in the Leadership 
Effectiveness and Development class. Female is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject is female and zero if the 
subject is male. Race Black is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject is black and zero otherwise. U.S. Citizen is a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject is a citizen of the United States and zero otherwise. GPA is the student's final 
grade point average in the MBA program. Father B.A. or higher is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the father has a 
bachelor's degree or above and zero otherwise. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% *** significant at 0.1% 
                 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Trust Game Variables                         
# of times subject returned less 
than first mover sent 
-4.90***           2.66        
(1.82)         (2.62)        
# of times the subject returned 
zero 
  -4.69*         3.32      
  (2.42)         (2.90)      
Return Ratio Average      48.10***         -18.20    
    (15.03)         (25.72)    
Reciprocator        60.09***        24.57 
      (14.85)        (21.36) 
Return Ratio 50           67.65***  64.54***  68.62***  40.08** 
         (18.27)  (15.30)  (21.35)  (18.12) 
Other Variables                         
Committee Member  59.86  59.11  64.05  61.07  63.38  63.12  62.35  63.31 
(56.23)  (56.51)  (56.68)  (56.95)  (57.36)  (57.41)  (57.02)  (56.67) 
LEAD Facilitator  28.86  31.25  30.73  31.48  27.09  25.65  26.23  28.66 




31.99*  -25.26  -23.24  -29.12*  -24.14  -28.68*  -26.21 




46.92*  -49.29*  -44.58*  -44.95*  -44.81*  -45.35*  -46.34* 
   (27.49)  (27.69)  (26.71)  (26.75)  (26.66)  (26.75)  (26.60)  (26.46) 
U.S. Citizen  -8.96  -8.25  -7.17  -8.23  -7.44  -8.19  -7.96  -7.52 
   (15.65)  (15.69)  (15.62)  (15.52)  (15.60)  (15.50)  (15.52)  (15.54) 
G.P.A.  33.09  33.40  38.21  31.76  31.49  30.46  30.22  32.80 
   (24.36)  (24.44)  (24.40)  (24.23)  (23.97)  (24.09)  (23.98)  (24.19) 
Father B.A. or higher  -17.93  -15.92  -18.48  -17.20  -17.15  -18.15  -17.29  -17.79 
(22.87)  (22.74)  (22.58)  (22.49)  (22.31)  (22.39)  (22.40)  (22.30) 
Constant  36.72  24.69  -45.29  -11.51  -59.95  -48.60  -29.03  -38.07 
(81.21)  (80.63)  (82.18)  (80.44)  (85.55)  (82.02)  (80.81)  (81.59) 
Observations  461  461  461  461  461  461  461  461 
R-squared  0.035  0.029  0.045  0.054  0.063  0.063  0.062  0.064 
 
 Table 6: OLS Regression of Cooperation Game on Final Donation Amount 
This table shows the estimates of a linear regression model where the dependent variable is the Final Gift Amount. 
Unconditional Cooperative Type is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject chose to cooperate and zero if the 
subject chose to defect in an 8-person Prisoner's Dilemma game, regardless of the other players' strategies. 
Conditional Cooperative Type is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject chose to cooperate and zero if the 
subject chose to defect if all the other players are cooperating in an 8-person Prisoner's Dilemma game. Donation 
Pledged is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject pledged to pay a donation by December 31, 2008 rather 
than paying it outright and equal to zero otherwise. Committee Member is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the 
subject was a member of the Class Gift fundraising committee. LEAD Facilitator is a dummy variable that is equal to 
1 if the subject was a facilitator in the Leadership Effectiveness and Development class. Female is a dummy variable 
that is equal to 1 if the subject is female and zero if the subject is male. Race Black is a dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 if the subject is black and zero otherwise. U.S. Citizen is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject is a 
citizen of the United States and zero otherwise. GPA is the student's final grade point average in the MBA program. 
Father B.A. or higher is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the father has a bachelor's degree or above and zero 
otherwise. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.* significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1% *** significant at 0.1% 
             
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
   Conditional Cooperation  Unconditional Cooperation 
Conditional Cooperative Type  -6.92  -6.72  -3.31          
(15.54)  (15.58)  (15.65)         
Unconditional Cooperative Type        29.54  29.30  33.74* 
         (17.95)  (18.06)  (18.44) 
Other Variables                   
Committee Member    39.13  57.28     42.15  61.47 
  (58.49)  (57.69)     (59.31)  (58.47) 
LEAD Facilitator    31.12  29.34     28.28  26.77 
  (36.76)  (37.74)     (37.21)  (38.13) 
Female      -25.92       -27.14* 
    (16.26)       (16.26) 
Race Black      -43.07       -49.66* 
       (27.89)       (28.32) 
U.S. Citizen      -9.57       -11.92 
       (15.70)       (15.78) 
G.P.A.      29.54       27.24 
       (24.31)       (24.29) 
Father B.A. or higher      -16.06       -17.82 
      (23.13)        (23.08) 
Constant  104.57***  100.74***  30.76  91.66***  88.10***  29.72 
(11.25)  (11.56)  (80.48)  (8.66)  (8.41)  (80.60) 
Observations  462  462  461  462  462  461 
R-squared  0.000  0.005  0.022  0.007  0.012  0.031 
 Table 7a: Impact of Social Desirability Index on Real-World Donation and Trust Game Behavior 
This table shows the OLS estimates of a linear regression model where the dependent variable is the Original Gift Amount in Columns 1-3, the Final Gift Amount in 
Columns 4-6, and the Return ratio when the first mover sends $50 in the trust game in Columns 7-9. Social Desirability Index is a variable equal to the number of times 
(out of 10) the subject indicated true on our shortened version of the Crowne-Marlowe social desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). Donation Pledged is a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject pledged to pay a donation by December 31, 2008 rather than paying it outright and equal to zero otherwise. Committee 
Member is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject was a member of the Class Gift fundraising committee. LEAD Facilitator is a dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 if the subject was a facilitator in the Leadership Effectiveness and Development class. Female is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject is female and zero 
if the subject is male. Race Black is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject is black and zero otherwise. U.S. Citizen is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if 
the subject is a citizen of the United States and zero otherwise. GPA is the student's final grade point average in the MBA program. Father B.A. or higher is a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if the father has a bachelor's degree or above and zero otherwise. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% *** significant at 0.1% 
                   
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  
Original Donation Amount  Final Donation Amount  Trust Game (Return ratio when first 
mover sends $50) 
Social Desirability Index  12.52***  11.90***  9.55**  4.31  4.14  4.34  0.01  0.01  0.01 
   (4.73)  (4.53)  (4.48)  (3.67)  (3.71)  (3.71)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Donation Pledged (Yes = 1)  191.01***  185.09***  186.90***                 
(17.43)  (17.24)  (17.61)                 
Committee Member     172.91***  179.41***     36.69  55.45     -0.09  -0.12 
   (50.22)  (50.12)     (59.40)  (58.71)     (0.11)  (0.11) 
LEAD Facilitator     93.99***  94.79***     31.77  29.40     0.03  0.04 
   (34.63)  (35.99)     (36.38)  (37.32)     (0.10)  (0.10) 
Female       -10.73       -26.21       0.03 
     (19.28)       (16.14)       (0.06) 
Race Black       13.95       -44.87       0.06 
        (35.70)       (27.83)       (0.13) 
U.S. Citizen       -31.99*       -5.98       -0.03 
        (18.02)       (15.81)       (0.06) 
G.P.A.       6.33       30.73       -0.06 
        (25.64)       (24.37)       (0.09) 
Father B.A. or higher       -44.14*       -14.19       0.04 
     (25.96)       (23.18)       (0.08) 
Constant  56.88***  48.66***  93.39  86.48***  83.34***  6.86  1.04***  1.04***  1.21*** 
(16.73)  (16.19)  (92.03)  (13.45)  (13.62)  (83.17)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.31) 
Observations  462  462  461  462  462  461  462  462  461 
R-squared  0.227  0.269  0.280  0.003  0.007  0.025  0.002  0.003  0.006 Table 7b: Reputation Effects versus Social Preferences 
This table shows the OLS estimates of a linear regression model where the dependent variable is the donation amount. 
Columns 1-3 report the regression results using the Original Gift Amount as the dependent variable. Columns 4-6 
report the regression results using the Final Gift Amount as the dependent variable. Social Desirability Index is a 
variable equal to the number of times (out of 10) the subject indicated true on our shortened version of the Crowne-
Marlowe social desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). Donation Pledged is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 
if the subject pledged to pay a donation by December 31, 2008 rather than paying it outright and equal to zero 
otherwise. Committee Member is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject was a member of the Class Gift 
fundraising committee. LEAD Facilitator is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject was a facilitator in the 
Leadership Effectiveness and Development class. Female is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject is female 
and zero if the subject is male. Race Black is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject is black and zero 
otherwise. U.S. Citizen is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the subject is a citizen of the United States and zero 
otherwise. GPA is the student's final grade point average in the MBA program. Father B.A. or higher is a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if the father has a bachelor's degree or above and zero otherwise. Heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% *** significant at 0.1% 
             
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
   Original Donation Amount  Final Donation Amount 
Return ratio when first mover sends $50  57.30***  58.81***  58.11***  52.14***  52.35***  54.64*** 
(16.32)  (16.15)  (16.33)  (12.38)  (12.47)  (12.52) 
Social Desirability Index  16.47***  15.43***  14.08***  3.61  3.43  3.71 
(5.18)  (4.93)  (4.95)  (3.69)  (3.73)  (3.70) 
Committee Member     230.29***  235.07***     41.34  61.90 
   (50.98)  (51.24)     (58.70)  (57.65) 
LEAD Facilitator     80.91**  79.47*     30.10  27.11 
   (40.46)  (40.48)     (35.63)  (36.46) 
Female       -24.01       -27.80* 
     (21.36)       (16.06) 
Race Black       36.29       -48.06* 
     (41.39)       (26.52) 
U.S. Citizen       -3.69       -4.37 
     (19.51)       (15.50) 
G.P.A.       -14.48       33.87 
     (30.14)       (24.20) 
Father B.A. or higher       -44.12       -16.22 
     (28.87)       (22.39) 
Constant  75.82***  63.31**  160.31  32.22*  28.89  -59.36 
(25.71)  (25.66)  (109.67)  (17.66)  (17.88)  (83.45) 
Observations  462  462  461  462  462  461 
R-squared  0.052  0.110  0.123  0.038  0.043  0.063 
  
 
Table 8: "Economists" and the Social Desirability Index 
This table presents the cross-tabulations of the mean, standard deviation and number of observations available for the 
Original Gift Amount, Final Gift Amount, Donation Pledged, and the number of students who defaulted on a pledged 
donation, divided according to whether the individual is an "Economist" (i.e. returned zero when the sender sent $50) 
or a "Non-economist" (i.e. returned a positive amount when the sender sent $50) and whether the individual's score on 
the social desirability scale was “above the median” or “equal to or below the median”. Social Desirability Index is a 
variable equal to the number of times (out of 10) the subject indicated true on our shortened version of the Crowne-
Marlowe social desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). 
           












Economist (i.e. returned zero when sender sent $50) 
Mean  Equal to or below median  137.36  74.75  0.286  0.625 
Standard Deviation     192.83  136.23  0.460  0.518 
N     28  28  28  8 
Mean  Above median  186.61  43.75  0.679  0.684 
Standard Deviation     215.68  108.03  0.476  0.478 
N     28  28  28  19 
Non-economist (i.e. returned a positive amount when sender sent $50) 
Mean  Equal to or below median  167.87  98.53  0.451  0.598 
Standard Deviation     188.69  159.82  0.499  0.493 
N     226  226  226  102 
Mean  Above median  237.59  117.57  0.556  0.590 
Standard Deviation     234.82  185.20  0.498  0.494 
N     180  180  180  100 
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Appendix A: Ordered Probit Analysis of the Determinants of Original Gift Amount 
This table shows the marginal effects estimates of an ordered probit model where the dependent variables are the donation 
categories of the Original Gift Amount. Each panel represents the analysis for a single donation category.  Panel I shows the 
marginal effects for the "No Donation" category, II shows "Member's Circle", III shows "Scholar's Circle", and IV shows 
"Leader's Circle.  The final rows are a calculation of the expected value of the contribution using the minimum donation 
necessary to achieve a category, the mean donation for a category, and the median donation for each category. This number is 
comparable to the coefficient in a standard linear regression. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in every 
second row in parentheses. 
           
Panel I 
   1  2  3  4  5 
No Donation (mean = $0) 
Return ratio when first mover sends $50  -0.0308**  -0.0224**  -0.0218**  -0.0217**  -0.0234** 
(0.011)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Donation Pledged (Yes = 1)    -0.0961***  -0.0923***  -0.0926***  -0.0951*** 
  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.018) 
Committee Member      -0.0289***  -0.0291***  -0.0295*** 
    (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
LEAD Facilitator      -0.0260**  -0.0246**  -0.0251** 
    (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Female        0.0065  0.0032 
      (0.009)  (0.009) 
Race Black        0.0134  0.0262 
         (0.021)  (0.027) 
U.S. Citizen        0.0051  0.0051 
         (0.008)  (0.008) 
G.P.A.        -0.0191  -0.0216 
         (0.012)  (0.012) 
Father B.A. or higher          0.0217** 
        (0.008) 
Panel II 
Member's Circle ($1-207) (mean = 54.788) 
Return ratio when first mover sends $50  -0.0703**  -0.0896**  -0.0929**  -0.0960***  -0.1054*** 
(0.024)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.030) 
Donation Pledged (Yes = 1)    -0.3226***  -0.3283***  -0.3391***  -0.3483*** 
  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.038) 
Committee Member      -0.2649*  -0.2988**  -0.3184** 
    (0.106)  (0.105)  (0.103) 
LEAD Facilitator      -0.1930*  -0.1881*  -0.1983* 
    (0.079)  (0.081)  (0.082) 
Female        0.0272  0.0138 
      (0.036)  (0.037) 
Race Black        0.0480  0.0799 
         (0.061)  (0.054) 
U.S. Citizen        0.0229  0.0236 
         (0.035)  (0.036) 
G.P.A.        -0.0845  -0.0970 
         (0.052)  (0.054) 
Father B.A. or higher          0.1371* 
        (0.056)  
 
Panel III 
Scholar's Circle ($208-500) (mean = $235.893) 
Return ratio when first mover sends $50  0.0228**  0.0330**  0.0351**  0.0368**  0.0414** 
(0.008)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
Donation Pledged (Yes = 1)    0.1097***  0.1144***  0.1191***  0.1249*** 
  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.019) 
Committee Member      0.0428***  0.0428**  0.0424* 
    (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.017) 
LEAD Facilitator      0.0437***  0.0446***  0.0470*** 
    (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Female        -0.0108  -0.0055 
      (0.015)  (0.015) 
Race Black        -0.0209  -0.0392 
         (0.030)  (0.034) 
U.S. Citizen        -0.0086  -0.0091 
         (0.013)  (0.014) 
G.P.A.        0.0324  0.0381 
         (0.020)  (0.021) 
Father B.A. or higher          -0.0411** 
        (0.014) 
Panel IV 
Leader's Circle ($501 or more) (mean = $524.488) 
Return ratio when first mover sends $50  0.0783**  0.0790***  0.0796***  0.0808***  0.0875*** 
(0.026)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Donation Pledged (Yes = 1)    0.3090***  0.3062***  0.3127***  0.3185*** 
  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.033) 
Committee Member      0.2511*  0.2850*  0.3055* 
    (0.115)  (0.118)  (0.119) 
LEAD Facilitator      0.1754*  0.1681*  0.1763* 
    (0.078)  (0.078)  (0.080) 
Female        -0.0229  -0.0115 
      (0.030)  (0.031) 
Race Black        -0.0404  -0.0668 
         (0.051)  (0.047) 
U.S. Citizen        -0.0193  -0.0196 
         (0.029)  (0.030) 
G.P.A.        0.0712  0.0806 
         (0.043)  (0.044) 
Father B.A. or higher          -0.1177* 
        (0.050) 
Observations  463  463  463  462  443 
                 
Expected Value of the Contribution (using min)  43.900  46.353  47.088  48.039  52.343 
Expected Value of the Contribution (using mean)  42.594  44.310  44.939  45.800  49.884 
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Appendix B: Ordered Probit Analysis of the Determinants of Final Gift Amount 
This table shows the marginal effects estimates of an ordered probit model where the dependent 
variables are the donation categories of the Final Gift Amount. Each panel represents the analysis for a 
single donation category.  Panel I shows the marginal effects for the "No Donation" category, II 
shows "Member's Circle", III shows "Scholar's Circle", and IV shows "Leader's Circle.  The final 
rows are a calculation of the expected value of the contribution using the minimum donation 
necessary to achieve a category, the mean donation for a category, and the median donation for each 
category. This number is comparable to the coefficient in a standard linear regression. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in every second row in parentheses. 
       
Panel I 
   1  2  3 
No Donation (mean = $0) 
Return ratio when first mover sends $50  -0.0918**  -0.0909**  -0.0994** 
(0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
Committee Member    0.1194  0.0639 
  (0.116)  (0.115) 
LEAD Facilitator    -0.0676  -0.0376 
  (0.068)  (0.071) 
Female      0.0223 
    (0.043) 
U.S. Citizen      0.0163 
       (0.039) 
G.P.A.      -0.2071*** 
       (0.057) 
Father B.A. or higher      0.0474 
    (0.051) 
Panel II 
Member's Circle ($1-207) (mean = 54.788) 
Return ratio when first mover sends $50  0.0225*  0.0224*  0.0253* 
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
Committee Member    -0.0437  -0.0207 
  (0.055)  (0.045) 
LEAD Facilitator    0.0113  0.0079 
  (0.007)  (0.012) 
Female      -0.0059 
    (0.012) 
U.S. Citizen      -0.0041 
       (0.010) 
G.P.A.      0.0526** 
       (0.019) 
Father B.A. or higher      -0.0099 







         
 
Panel III 
Scholar's Circle ($208-500) (mean = $235.893) 
Return ratio when first mover sends $50  0.0255**  0.0252**  0.0279** 
(0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Committee Member    -0.0305  -0.0171 
  (0.027)  (0.029) 
LEAD Facilitator    0.0194  0.0108 
  (0.020)  (0.021) 
Female      -0.0062 
    (0.012) 
U.S. Citizen      -0.0046 
       (0.011) 
G.P.A.      0.0581** 
       (0.018) 
Father B.A. or higher      -0.0136 
    (0.015) 
Panel IV 
Leader's Circle ($501 or more) (mean = $524.488) 
Return ratio when first mover sends $50  0.0438**  0.0433**  0.0463** 
(0.016)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Committee Member    -0.0452  -0.0261 
  (0.035)  (0.041) 
LEAD Facilitator    0.0369  0.0189 
  (0.043)  (0.039) 
Female      -0.0102 
    (0.019) 
U.S. Citizen      -0.0076 
       (0.019) 
G.P.A.      0.0964*** 
       (0.028) 
Father B.A. or higher      -0.0238 
    (0.028) 
Observations  462  462  461 
           
Expected Value of the Contribution (using min)  27.270  26.957  29.025 
Expected Value of the Contribution (using mean)  30.656  30.312  32.703 
Expected Value of the Contribution (using median)  28.424  28.105  30.320 
 
 